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JURISDICTION
Originally brought before the Utah Supreme Court under Utah Code Annotated
(“UCA”) § 78A-3-102(3)(j), this matter has been poured over by the Supreme Court to
the Court of Appeals pursuant to UCA § 78A-3-102(4). The Court of Appeals, of course,
has jurisdiction over matters thus transferred. UCA § 78A-4-103(2)(j).

STANDARDS OF REVIEW & ISSUES
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW ON APPEAL: “ ‘When a lower court reviews an order of an
administrative agency and we exercise appellate review of the lower court's judgment, we
act as if we were reviewing the administrative agency decision directly’ and ‘do not
defer, or accord a presumption of correctness, to the lower court’s decision.’ ” Save Our
Canyons v. Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake County, 2005 UT App 285, at ¶12, 116
P.3d 978, (quoting Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT 98, ¶ 17, 104 P.3d 1208
(citations omitted)).
ISSUES:

Whether the District Court properly granted Pacific summary and

declaratory judgment on its bona-fide purchaser and PUD-invalidity claims—
1.

Despite Pacific’s improper inclusion in a Petition for Review of a cause of

action beyond the scope of the permitted review (Preserved: R. 203–07).
A.

Relevant Law: UCA § 10-9a-801; UCA § 78B-6-405; and URCP 56.

B.

Standard of Review: Under UCA § 10-9a-801(3)(a), the Court must

“presume that [the City’s] decision … is valid; and determine only whether or not
the decision … is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal.” See Carrier v. Salt Lake County,
2004 UT 98, ¶26, 104 P.3d 1208 (citing Patterson v. Utah County Bd. of
4846-2457-1395.GR058.001
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Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602, 603-04 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
2.

Despite its failure to raise before the Grantsville City Council its bona-fide

purchaser and PUD-invalidity claims (Preserved: R. 207–08).
A.

Relevant Law:

UCA § 10-9a-701(4)(c); and Grantsville Land Use

Development and Management Code (the “Grantsville Code” or “City Code”) §
3.22: “In making an appeal, an adversely affected party shall present to the appeal
authority every theory of relief that it can raise in district court.”
B.

Standard of Review: This issue falls within the summary-judgment

standard of review cited above.
3.

Based upon evidence outside the record, despite Utah law’s proscription

against considering or even receiving such evidence (Preserved: R. 207–08).
A.

Relevant Law: UCA § 10-9a-801

B.

Standard of Review: District court review is limited to the record

provided by the [administrative body] .... The court may not accept or consider any
evidence outside th[at] … record ....’” Patterson v. Utah County Bd. of Adjustment,
893 P.2d 602, 605 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 17-27708(5)(a) (1991), which is substantially similar to Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(8))
(2008).
4.

On its claim to being a bona-fide purchaser despite its having had both

record and inquiry notice of the restrictions on development applicable to the PUD
(Preserved: R. 205–07).
A.

Relevant Law: UCA § 57-3-103; UCA § 70A-8-302; Salt Lake County
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v. Metro West Ready Mix, Inc., 2004 UT 23, ¶13, 89 P.3d 155.
B.

Standard of Review: A “determination of whether … property [has

been] sold to a bona-fide purchaser or to one with actual or constructive notice …
involves questions of fact which must be determined by the trial court on remand.”
Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381, 1393 (Utah 1996).
5.

Based on Pacific’s incorrect interpretation of Grantsville City’s Land Use

Code § 12.4(5) (Preserved: R. 204–05).
A.

Relevant Law: Grantsville Land Use Development and Management

Code (the “Grantsville Code” or “City Code”) § 12.4(5): “No planned unit
development permit shall be valid for a period longer than one year unless a
building permit has been issued, construction has actually begun within that period
and construction has been diligently pursued.”
B.

Standard of Review: Utah appellate courts “interpret municipal and

county ordinances and resolutions according to our well-settled rules of statutory
interpretation and construction. ‘When interpreting statutes, we determine the
statute’s meaning by first looking to the statute’s plain language, and give effect to
the plain language unless the language is ambiguous.’ ” Pinetree Associates v.
Ephraim City, 2003 UT 6, ¶13, 67 P.3d 462 (quoting Blackner v. Dep't of Transp.,
2002 UT 44, ¶12, 48 P.3d 949) (further citations and quotations omitted).
STANDARDS OF REVIEW:
All of the issues before the Court derive, as set forth above, from the District
Court’s grant of Pacific’s motion for summary judgment (URCP 56) and declaratory
4846-2457-1395.GR058.001
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judgment (UCA § 78B-6-401 et seq. (formerly UCA Chap. 78-33)). The appellate courts
review a “trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment for correctness, ‘granting no
deference to the trial court’s determination.’” Granite Credit Union v. Remick, 2006 UT
App 115, ¶7, 133 P.3d 440 (quoting Brown v. Wanlass, 2001 UT App 30, ¶4, 18 P.3d
1137), and viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT 98, ¶3, 104
P.3d 1208. “However, ‘[b]ecause summary judgment, by definition, does not resolve
factual issues, a challenge for summary judgment presents for review only questions of
law.’” Kelly v. Hard Money Funding, Inc., 2004 UT App 44, ¶13, 87 P.3d 734 (quoting
Dikeou v. Osborn, 881 P.2d 943, 945 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
The standard used in the review of a district court’s legal conclusions vis-à-vis entry
of a declaratory judgment “is the same standard used in reviewing a summary judgment.
That is, … correctness,” Board of Educ. of Alpine Dist. v. Ward, 1999 UT 17, ¶8, 974
P.2d 824 (citing Camp v. Office of Recovery Services, 779 P.2d 242, 244 (Utah Ct. App.
1989)), while “the trial court’s decision to either grant or deny declaratory relief … [is
reviewed] for an abuse of discretion,” Boyle v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 866 P.2d
595, 598 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Set Forth in Full in the Attached Addendum, at Tab A
— UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: Rule 56(c)
— UTAH CODE ANNOTATED: UCA § 10-9a-801
UCA § 10-9a-701

4846-2457-1395.GR058.001
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UCA § 70A-8-302
UCA § 78B-6-401

— GRANTSVILLE LAND USE MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CODE:
§ 3.22 Appeals.

§ 3.24 Due Process

§ 7.8 Determination

§ 12.1 Purpose

§ 12.2 Authority to Modify Regulations

§ 12.3 Minimum Area

§ 12.4 Application Procedure

§ 12.5 Adjustments To Development Plan.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE. Grantsville seeks appellate review of the Third District
Court’s May 20, 2008, Orders granting Pacific West Communities, Inc.’s (“Pacific’s”),
motions for summary and declaratory judgment.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS & DISPOSITION BELOW. This latest round in
Grantsville’s dispute with Pacific began with Pacific’s submission of its latest proposal to
build out Phase 2 of the Country Haven Condominiums with a development, to be called
“Orchard Park Condo Area,” significantly different from the approved April 1998 plans.
(R. at 44: Exh. 9, pp. 2–5, 10–12.)
The Grantsville Planning Commission recommended approval of Pacific’s proposal
at its January 11, 2007, meeting (R. at 44: Exh. 9, p. 12), but the Grantsville City Council
denied the proposed plan at its February 21, 2007, meeting (R. at 44: Exh. 5, pp. 13–14).
Written findings and conclusions were entered on March 7, 2007. (R. at 44: Exh. 2.)
Pacific filed a Petition for Review in the Third District Court for Tooele County on
April 6, 2007. (R. at 14.) The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment—
Pacific’s being supplemented, contrary to the prohibition of UCA § 10-9a-801, with the
Affidavits of Dennis Vanderheiden, Douglas Gibson, and Caleb Roope. (R. at 79–102.)
The court received the extraneous affidavits and heard argument on the motions on
February 22, 2008. (R. at 301, pp. 1–122.)
4846-2457-1395.GR058.001
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The court granted Grantsville’s motion for summary judgment, ruling from the
bench that “substantial evidence support[ed] the decision of the City.” (R. at 301, pp.
118–119. A copy of the relevant portion of the February 22, 2008 Hearing Transcript is
attached in the Addendum at Tab B.) The court thereupon dismissed Pacific’s appeal. (R.
at 301, p. 119:5–6.) But the court then went on to grant Pacific’s motions for summary
and declaratory judgment, finding Pacific “a bonafide purchaser … not bound by the
covenants or restrictions” and the PUD terminated based on Grantsville Code §12.4(5),
the statute of frauds, and the applicable CC&Rs. (R. at 250 & 301, pp. 119–120.)
Following an objection, a hearing, and a revised ruling (R. at 265), the
memorializing Orders were filed on May 20, 2008 (R. at 266–74.

A copy of the

Declaratory Judgment, dated May 20, 2008, is attached in the Addendum at Tab C, and a
copy of Order on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, dated May 20, 2008 is attached
in the Addendum at Tab D). Grantsville filed its Notice of Appeal on May 23, 2008 (R. at
275–76), and Pacific filed a cross-appeal on June 17, 2008 (R. at 302–04).
STATEMENT OF FACTS. On December 17, 1997, pursuant to Chapter 12 of the
Grantsville City Land Use Management and Development Code (the “City Code”), the
Grantsville City Council approved a multiphase Planned Unit Development known as
Country Haven Condominiums (“PUD” or “Country Haven”). (R. at 44: Exh. 12.)
Chapter 12 authorizes exceptions, for good cause, to the standard subdivision and
development regulations, and Country Haven was eventually granted limited variances
for the width of the entrance road, from other street specifications and variances from
certain building setback and building height requirements. (R. at 44: Exh. 12.)
4846-2457-1395.GR058.001
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The original developer finalized the engineering drawings for Country Haven on
November 20, 1997. These were reviewed and approved as part of the approval of
Country Haven Phase I as well as the concept plan for the development of the Future
Phases. These include the various specifics of the future phases (R. at 44: Exh. 22):
a. The Grading Plan for the future phases, describing the elevations of the
road, buildings, and storm retention areas (R. at 44: Exh. 22, Grading Plan—Sheet 3
of 10);
b. The Utility Plan for the future phases (R. at 44: Exh. 22, Utility Plan—
Sheet 4 of 10), including the size and layout of the sewer lines and related fixtures
and the layout of the culinary water system and fire hydrants;
c. The Plan and Profile for all of the roads in the project, including detailed
specifications for the future phases (R. at 44: Exh. 22, Plan and Profile, Sheets 5, 6,
and 7 of 10);
d. The Storm Drain details for the entire project, including the future phases
(R. at 44: Exh. 22, Storm Drain Details, 8 of 10);
e. The identification of specific building (unit) types (A, C, D, E, and F) for
each of the residential units in the entire project. Unit types C, D, E, and F are
located in both Phase 1 and in the Future Phases. Unit type A is located only in the
Future Phases, and there are only four type A units specified therein. The same
building (unit) type designations in Phase 1 and the Future Phases are identical in
size and configuration (R. at 44: Exh 22, Sheets 3 and 4 of 10);
f.
The driveway dimensions for the Project: Unit types C, D, E, and F
show driveways that are wide enough to accommodate two cars and two-car
garages. Unit type A shows a driveway that is only wide enough to accommodate a
single car and a single-car garage (Id.);
g. Each building (units) designation—A, C, D, E, and F—consistently
applies to buildings identical in size and configuration to all other buildings of the
same designation (E≡E; B≡B; and so forth) within the project, in both Phase 1 and
the future phases (Id.);
The final (concept) development plan for the future phases of the Country Haven
Condominiums was also included as a part of the Final Plat for Phase 1 of the project.
This plan was specifically approved by the Planning Commission and the City Council,
4846-2457-1395.GR058.001
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as noted by the signatures of the Chair of the Planning Commission and the signature of
the Mayor on the Final Recorded Plat. The development plan for the future phases as
identified on the Final Plat, includes the following (R. at 44: Exh. 23):
a. A scale drawing showing the exact layout of the future phases including
the roads, buildings, storm retention areas and a sports court area.
b. The location and scale drawing of 23 buildings with 63 residential units
in future phases.
c. The identification of specific building (residential unit) types with the
designations of A, C, D, E, and F.
d. Scale drawings of the residential units in Phase 1 and the future phases,
which are identical in size and configuration.
e. Driveway dimensions for all building (unit) types A, C, D, E and F,
which show that are wide enough to accommodate two cars side by side and two car
garages. Unit type A shows a driveway that is only wide enough to accommodate a
single car and single car garage.
(Id.).
The Preliminary Plans submitted by the developer and approved by the City (R. at
44: Exh. 22), also show the same detail for the completion of the future phases as it does
for the completion of Phase 1. The “Grading Plan,” for the future phases, lists the
elevations of the roads, buildings, and storm retention areas and identifies flow directions
and the exact location and elevations of storm drain lines (Id. at Sheet 3 of 10). The
“Utility Plan” for the future phases, includes the size and layout of the sewer and
waterlines, manholes, valves and fire hydrants (Id. at Sheet 4 of 10). The “Plan and
Profile” for all of the roads in the project, includes detailed specifications for the future
phases (Id. at Sheets 6 and 7 of 10). The “Storm Drain” details for the entire project,
including the future phases are also included in the preliminary plans. (Id. at Sheet 8 of
4846-2457-1395.GR058.001
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10).
Based upon these detailed plans for the entire project, the developer’s only real
decision was how it would phase the balance of the project and then obtain approval of
the City to record that phase or request changes to development plan in compliance with
Section 12-5 of the Land Use Code. The developer on August 14, 1997 indicated that the
project would be completed in six phases (R. at 44: Exh. 16, p. 1).
On the final approved plat, the building (unit) types for Phase 1 were crossed out
and unit numbers were inserted at the request of the Tooele County Recorder, so that
each of the units could be conveyed by a specific Unit Number (R. at 44: Exh. 23). The
Preliminary Plan and Final Plat submitted by Pacific’s predecessor and that were
approved by the City, clearly refer to and identify how the future phases of the project
would be built, as was required by the City’s Land Use Code and as a condition for
approval of the first phase (R. at 44: Exh. 22 and Exh. 23). Although these plans and plat
don’t have “Development Plan” written on them, the detail of the plans for the future
phases makes it clear that these were intended to constitute the Final Development Plan
for this project.
The development of the balance of the project in phases, was subject to the specific
approval of the City as noted in the City Council minutes of December 17, 1997, when
the City Council approved the first phase with “approval for (future) phasing conditioned
upon approval of the City Engineer and City Council for each phase” (R. at 44: Exh. 12).
The developer in 1997 had requested and was granted the option of completing the
balance of the project in one or more phases (R. at 44: 16, p. 1). Utah law and the City’s
4846-2457-1395.GR058.001
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Land Use Code require that each phase (plat) be reviewed and approved by the City prior
to the recording of the plat for a particular phase. The City had a legal duty to review
each subsequent phase and to approve the project if it was consistent with the Final
Development Plan proposed by the developer and approved by the City.
After the final approval of the Phase 1 plat, the original developer commenced
construction in Phase 1. In 2004, the original developer conveyed and assigned all of its
interest in the Country Haven Condominium project to Pacific (R. at 164). Upon
obtaining title to the condominium project, Pacific determined to modify the PUD as it
applied to the future phases.
Nearly ten years after the final approval of the Phase 1 plat, Pacific proposed the
completion of the future phase(s) of the Country Haven Condominium project by
submitting a new and revised development plan to the Grantsville City Planning
Commission. Pacific has designated the balance of the project as Phase 2. Pacific’s
proposed development plan included the following (R. at 44: Exh. 21):
a. The construction of 22 buildings with 65 residential units placed in
locations different than proposed in the approved development plan.
b. Building types not the same as those located in Phase 1 or those
identified in the future phases on the original approved plat.
c. A reconfigured street layout and drainage plan, that is different from the
engineering plans that were approved with the original development plan.
d. The area of the residential units proposed for Phase 2 are from 975
square feet to 1174 feet and all include a single car garage with no plans for
basements in any unit.
(R. at 44: Exh. 21; Exh. 9, p. 11; Exh. 5, p. 4.)
On January 11, 2007, the Grantsville City Planning Commission held a hearing on
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Pacific’s revised development plan for the Condominium Project (R. 44: Exh. 9). David
P. “Dade” Rose representing Pacific before the Planning Commission at this meeting
attempted to make it clear that the completion of the project was in substantial conformity
with the initially approved development plan. According to the minutes of this meeting,
Mr. Rose stated: “We believe we are complying with what happened in 1998 (sic)” and
... “we feel we have kept the plan close to conditions set by the Commission ten years
(ago)” (Id. at p. 4). However, statements made later during the same meeting by Pacific’s
architect Doug Gibson made it clear that Pacific’s revised development plan had some
similarities but would not substantially conform to the original: “The placement of the
units on the site is based on a previously approved condo plat and we have matched that
as closely as possible.” ... “We reviewed the original construction documents for the first
eight (8) units and used the same massing, materials and look.” ... “As to the two car
garage concern, we tried to fit that plan in there, but we couldn’t.” (Id. at pp. 10 & 11).
On the other hand, the Planning Commission received information from others, including
Julie Black a resident of Phase 1 and the President of the Country Haven Condominiums
(the Phase 1 development), who stated on January 11, 2007 that the units in Phase 1 had
from 1,300 to 2,200 square feet excluding basements. (Id. at p. 11). An examination of
scale drawings of the units in the Preliminary Plans and Final Plat’s, using a simple ruler,
supports the information submitted by Julie Black.
Pacific’s application to amend the Development Plan for the future phases of the
project was approved by the Grantsville City Planning Commission on January 11, 2007.
(R. at 44: Exh. 9, p. 12).
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The Country Haven Homeowners’ Association and a group of property owners
located adjacent to the proposed Phase 2 (Orchard Lane Homeowners) appealed the
decision of the Planning Commission to the City Council, the Appeal Authority under
Grantsville City Code § 12.4(5) for such matters. These appellants argued that the
proposed development plan for the future phases was a major adjustment and was not in
substantial conformity with the original development plan for the project. (R. at 44: Exh.
7 and Exh. 8.)
On January 25, 2007, Pacific sent a letter to the Grantsville City Planning
Commission explaining that even though Pacific’s plans did not include basements for
Phase 2 of the project, Pacific was not opposed to basements and would consider
basements if the market so dictates, depending on each homeowner’s preference and the
related purchase price that the homeowner is willing to pay for such an addition. (R. at
158). This letter, however, was never a part of Pacific’s formal proposal to develop Phase
2 of the project, and it includes numerous qualifications that indicate that basements
would never be constructed.
During this appeal, Mr. Rose appeared on behalf of Pacific before the City Council
on February 7, 2007, and tried to convince the City Council that Pacific’s proposal was
either a minor adjustment to the 1997 development plan or if it was deemed to be a major
adjustment of the development plan, it could be approved pursuant to Section 12.5 of the
Land Use Code (R. at 44: Exh. 6). As reflected in the minutes of that meeting Mr. Rose
stated:
We believe that we are talking about a minor adjustment. Based on the notes
4846-2457-1395.GR058.001
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on the plat, you can see that minor changes are all that is happening with this
proposal. Even if it was not minor changes the Code does provide for major
adjustments to the PUD Ordinance. If you go back through the transcripts of
January 11, 2007, it talks about the standard for approving a major adjustment.
That requirement is that it must be in substantial conformity with the original
plan.
(Id. at p. 2).
The City Council held a hearing on February 21, 2007 to consider the appeals of the
Country Haven Homeowner’s Association and the Orchard Lane Homeowners (R. at 44:
Exh. 5). At this hearing, the Country Haven Homeowner’s Association presented the
following information to the Planning Commission and Grantsville City Council: (R. at
44: Exh. 5 and Exh. 7)
a. That all of the Units in Phase 1 of the project have two car garages and
basements.
b. The unit types C, D, E and F refer to specific floor plans identified as
Colorado, Dakota, Georgia and Florida. A copy of these floor plans and a
description of each of these unit types is attached to the City Council’s Findings and
Decision as Exhibit “A”. (R. at 44: Exh. 2.)
c. Unit types C, D, E and F have from 1300 to 2200 square feet and with
finished basements would have from 2600 to 3500 square feet of finished living
space.
d. The current unit owners in Phase 1 were informed by the original
developer, that the units in the Future Phases, would be identical to those in Phase 1
and that they relied on these representations when they purchased their units. (R. at
44: Exh. 7 and Exh. 5, p. 7)
At this hearing Mr. Rose, on behalf of Pacific, maintained the same position, that
the completion of the future phases of the project should be approved as either a minor or
major adjustment to the 1997 development plan (R. at 44: Exh. 5, p. 3-4). During his
presentation to the City Council, Mr. Rose attempted again to maintain that the revised
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development plan contained only minor changes. “First, there’s been a claim saying that
this project is not in substantial conformity with what was originally approved. Again,
there are two standards at play here. One standard if it’s a minor change, and a second
standard if it is a major change. A major change requires that the project be in substantial
conformity. However, a minor change does not even require that. We have approached
this Council as well as the Planning Commission believing that we meet both of those
standards.” (Id. at p. 3.) Mr. Rose then asserted that Pacific’s changes were only minor
changes to the original development plan including changes to the road layout and the
total number of units. (Id. at pp. 3 & 4.)
In addition, Mr. Rose in responding to the appealing parties’ arguments that
Pacific’s Phase 2 was not in conformity with the original development plan, conceded
that the revised development plan contained more than minor changes when he stated that
“You know, change is specifically built into the law. The law allows for a change
because of a change of circumstance, a change of dynamics, change of market and that’s
why we have these Ordinances that you have in Section 12.4 that specifically
incorporates the element of change and allows for PUD to change as a minor adjustment
or a major adjustment. So we aren’t talking about just little, simple things and that is
provided for.” (Id. at pp. 9 & 10.)
In addition to the statements from Pacific, the City Council considered at the appeal
hearing information from Julie Black (R. at 44: Exh. 5, p. 7-8; Exh. 7). After considering
all of the information provided to it, the Grantsville City Council on March 7, 2007
overturned the Planning Commission’s approval and rejected Pacific’s proposal to amend
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the development plan for Phase 2 of the County Haven Condominiums (R. at 44: Exh. 2
and Exh. 3. A copy of the City Council’s Findings and Decision is attached in the
Addendum at Tab E.) The City Council concluded that the proposed project constituted a
major adjustment to the approved development plan, would require a significant
modification of the previous written conditions of approval and was not in substantial
conformity to the previously approved final development plan. (R. at 44: Exh. 2.)
On April 6, 2007, Pacific filed an appeal of the City Council’s decision with the
Third Judicial District Court in Tooele County, including claims it had not raised before
the City Council or the Planning Commission (R. at 3-14). Grantsville prepared and
submitted the administrative record to the district court and filed a motion for summary
judgment on June 27, 2007 (R. at 28, 44). Pacific cross-filed for summary judgment as
well, on August 13, 2007 (R. at 47).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Grantsville City appeals the judgment of the district court on two main grounds:
FIRST,

that the district court improperly received and considered evidence and claims

Pacific never raised before the City Council; and, SECOND, that even if Pacific’s evidence
and claims were not barred, the district court nonetheless erred in granting Pacific
summary and declaratory judgment.
1.

IMPROPER SUBMISSION OF EVIDENCE OUTSIDE THE ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD.
UCA § 10-9a-801(3) mandates that a court reviewing a land-use decision must

presume it is valid and determine only whether it was arbitrary, capricious, or illegal.
Section 10-9a-801(8) limits the court’s review to the record made before the appeal
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authority: The court may neither accept nor consider any evidence outside the
administrative record unless it was offered at the administrative level but improperly
excluded or no record was made for the court to review. In addition to barring unraised
evidence, Utah law also bans unheard issues: “a party seeking review of agency action
must raise an issue before that agency to preserve the issue for further review.” Badger v.
Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998).
Pacific disregarded the prohibition, submitting testimony to the court in the form of
three affidavits, claiming its due process rights had been infringed by the City Council’s
consideration of a sales brochure submitted by Julie Black of the Country Haven
Homeowners Association. The brochure, however, simply reiterates evidence already
before the Council. Moreover, its submission is a non-issue: the court redacted the
brochure before ruling that Grantsville’s decision was warranted by substantial evidence
on the Record. The three affidavits should thus have been stricken.
They were not, however. Instead, Pacific used them as the basis of new claims,
none of which had been brought before the City Council: claiming to be a bona-fide
purchaser, that the PUD had expired, that the project’s CC&Rs were no longer
applicable, even that the statute of frauds somehow invalidated the development plan.
Again, however, none of these was brought to the awareness of the City Council, despite
the provision in the Grantsville Code (§ 3.22) that requires an adversely affected party to
present to the appeal authority every theory of relief it could raise in district court. In
sum, the three affidavits should have been stricken, Pacific’s extraneous claims based
upon them dismissed, and the district court’s judgment thereon vacated.
4846-2457-1395.GR058.001
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2.

THE COURT’S DECISION WAS ERRONEOUS.
Grantsville’s second ground for appeal is essentially that the district court’s granting

summary and declaratory judgment to Pacific on its various extraneous claims would
have been erroneous even if the three affidavits and the several claims Pacific based
thereon had been properly preserved and submitted.
To begin with, Pacific’s major premise—that there has never been a final
development plan to which it can be held—is untrue. There is a Development Plan: It is
comprised of the original, November 1997 engineering drawings requested by Garry
Bolinder and G&S Investments, Pacific’s predecessor in interest, together with the Final
Plat (R. at 44, exh. 23) recorded at the Bolinders’ request in May of 1998. These
documents specify utility locations, road locations, driveways, and the exact locations of
23 buildings making up 63 residential units, identified by the same letters and similar in
size and configuration to the buildings in the first phase. Pacific’s arguments before the
City Council also specifically and repeatedly referenced the original, 1997 development
plan, of which its new plan was to be a “minor alteration.” The existence of the Final
Plat, in its own records as well as in the County Recorder’s office would put Pacific on
actual, constructive, and inquiry notice of the PUD and its governing restrictions.
Pacific knew far too much about the PUD for far too long to claim that it was a
bona-fide purchaser, one of the new claims it raised before the district court. And whether
a party is a bona-fide purchaser is a question of fact anyway. This should have precluded
summary judgment on this point, and this Court is bound to vacate the award.
Pacific has also claimed that the PUD had expired by operation of the one-year
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diligent pursuit provision in Grantsville Code § 12.4(5). This provision is irrelevant,
however, since construction began in the first phase and was timely constructed, and
Section 12.4(5) doesn’t require build-out of future phases to satisfy the provision. Pacific
also claims that the applicable CC&Rs, having been amended, none of the final
development requirements any longer applies. In reality, though, a PUD cannot be
amended by filing a new set of CC&Rs, and the district court should not have ruled
otherwise. Finally, zoning restrictions, including the parameters of a PUD, are laws, not
contracts subject to the statute of frauds, despite Pacific’s claim to the contrary.

ARGUMENT
At issue in the present dispute is the district court’s grant of summary and declaratory
judgment to Pacific on its several claims regarding bona-fide purchase, termination of
relevant CC&Rs, and expiration of the PUD.1

I.

THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY RECEIVED AND CONSIDERED CLAIMS
AND EVIDENCE OUTSIDE THE RECORD BEFORE THE GRANTSVILLE CITY
COUNCIL.
A.

Utah Law Restricts District Court Review of Land-Use Appeals to the
Record Made before the Designated Local Land-Use or Appeal Authority.

1

Immediately after the granting Grantsville’s motion for summary judgment,
affirming the City’s denial of Pacific’s proposal as neither arbitrary and capricious nor
illegal, the district court turned around and granted Pacific’s summary and declaratory
judgment motions (R. at 301, pp. 118 to 122; R. at 268-74). Those motions, however,
asserted the validity of Pacific’s proposal on the grounds, inter alia, that Pacific was a
bona-fide purchaser and that the PUD had expired anyway—either of which, if true
(neither is), would have rendered Grantsville’s denial arbitrary and capricious (as
unsupported in the record) or illegal (as contrary to the laws regarding bona-fide purchase
and the interpretation of local ordinances). Thus, the district court’s upholding
Grantsville’s denial foreclosed its granting Pacific’s contradictory motions.
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UCA § 10-9a-801(3)(a) mandates that a court reviewing a land-use decision must
“(i) presume [the] decision … valid; and (ii) determine only whether [it was] arbitrary,
capricious, or illegal” (emphasis added). In making this determination, “a district court’s
review is limited to the record provided by the land use authority or appeal authority, as
the case may be,” id. §-801(8)(a)(i)(emphasis added); more to the point, “[t]he court may
not accept or consider any evidence outside the [administrative] record … unless [it] was
[a] offered [at the administrative level] and the court determines that it was improperly
excluded,” id. §-801(8)(a)(ii)(emphasis added), or [b] “[i]f there is no record” at all, id. §801(8)(b).
The Courts have often reaffirmed this basic rule, but nowhere more powerfully,
perhaps, than in Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844 (Utah 1998):
[A] party seeking review of agency action must raise an issue before that
agency to preserve the issue for further review. … [Moreover,] “persons
aggrieved by decisions of administrative agencies ‘may not, by refusing or
neglecting to submit issues of fact to such agencies, by-pass them, and call
upon the courts to determine ... matters properly determinable originally by
such agencies.’ ”
Id. at 847 (quoting S & G, Inc. v. Morgan, 797 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Utah 1990) (itself quoting
People v. Keith Ry. Equip. Co., 161 P.2d 244, 249 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1945))). Of course,

where an administrative record is incomplete or nonexistent, as in, for instance, Xanthos
v. Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake City, 685 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1984), where no
administrative record had been made, the Utah Supreme Court held that, since
[t]he nature and extent of the review depends on what happened below as
reflected by a true record of the proceedings … in the light of accepted due
process requirements.… [then, on the one hand,] if the [administrative]
hearing had proceeded in accordance with due process requirements, the
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reviewing court could look only to the record[; but, on the other hand], …
where it had not or where there was nothing to review, the reviewing court
must be allowed to get at the facts.
Id. at 1034 (emphasis added) (quoting Denver & Rio Grande W. RR. Co. v. Cent. Weber
Sewer Improvement Dist., 287 P.2d 884, 887 (Utah 1955)). Accordingly, the Xanthos
Court reasoned, “there [being] no record of the [administrative] proceedings, due process
would be denied if the district court could not get at the facts,” and so “the district court
[was permitted to] take additional evidence.” Id. Even then, however, the additional
evidence “must be relevant to the issues that were raised and considered by the Board.”
Id. at 1034–35.
Similarly, in B.A.M. Development, L.L.C. v. Salt Lake County, 2006 UT 2, 128
P.3d 1161, a local administrative body had upheld an exaction without holding any
hearing, taking any evidence, or issuing any findings or conclusions. As in Xanthos, the
reviewing district court determined to receive evidence, there being no record to review.
This Court, however, following the then-extant legislative mandate of UCA § 17-271001(3)(a)(repealed 2005), concluded that the district court had erred in receiving
evidence,2 and remanded the case for a determination as to which local body should
2

Former UCA § 17-27-1001(3)(a) was identical to former UCA § 10-9-1001(3)(a),
which was also repealed by the 2005 enactment of the new LUDMA (SB 60S02 (2005);
2005 Utah Laws 254). Neither of these sections addressed the role of an administrative
record. A provision limiting review to the record did appear in former UCA §§ 10-9708(5) & 17-27-708(5), but this Court read that provision as applicable only to review of
board-of-adjustment decisions, 2004 UT App 34, ¶7 nn. 5 & 6; this on the basis of a
canon of construction sometimes called “the dog in the night-time,” see Chisom v.
Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 396 n.23 (1991). The fact that §-708 (review of board-ofadjustment decisions) did permit the taking of evidence in the absence of a record while
§-1001 did not, was construed to bar acceptance of evidence in a review that did not
involve a board of adjustment. B.A.M., 2004 UT App 34 at ¶12.
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review the matter. B.A.M. v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT App 34, ¶13, 87 P.3d 710. The
Utah Supreme Court granted certiorari on August 5, 2004 (98 P.3d 1177 (Table)), but
ultimately declared the issue moot as a result of the passage of the 2005 LUDMA, which
“details proper district court review of a … land-use decision,” 2006 UT 2, ¶3, expressly
confining judicial review of administrative decisions to the record alone unless (and only
unless) that record is deficient.
As these various rulings and the related LUDMA provisions, make abundantly
clear, a party may not submit, nor a reviewing court receive, either issues or evidence
which were not first raised before or proffered to the administrative tribunal. This,
however, is precisely what Pacific and the district court have done in the present case.
B.

The District Court Improperly Considered the Affidavits Pacific
Presented for the First Time on Review.

Despite the clear mandate discussed above, Pacific submitted three affidavits—
those of Caleb Roope, Douglas Gibson, and Dennis Vanderheiden (R. at 79–85, 97–102,
& 93–96, respectively)—flatly inadmissible under UCA § 10-9a-801, on the grounds that
the Grantsville City Council “violated Pacific’s due process rights” (R. at 231). The
nature of this alleged violation appears to have been the City Council’s receipt and
reliance upon a sales brochure that Julie Black, president of the Country Haven
Homeowners Association, submitted after the City Council hearing on February 21,
2007, but before the Council’s decision issued on March 7, 2007 (R. at 230-31).
1.

The Propriety of the Brochure is a Non-Issue.

Even if the Julie Black brochure were somehow improper evidence—something
other than the simple summary it is of building types and floor plans already in the Final
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Development Plan and presented at the February 21, 2007, appeal hearing—its
evidentiary propriety is a non-issue because ultimately, the district court’s ruling was not
based in any way upon the Julie Black brochure:
What I’ve done is I’ve gone through the decision that was submitted as Exhibit
2 and I’ve redacted all of the information that was included in the letter by Ms.
Black to see if, in fact, it was an issue of harmless error to include her
conclusions despite the fact that the Petitioner didn’t have an opportunity to
respond to those in the meeting.
After I do redact those, I find that in fact there is substantial evidence
supporting the decision of the City and, therefore, the appeal based upon that
and based upon the quantum and quality of the evidence is adequate to
convince a reasonable mind to support the conclusion which is the requirement
or substantial evidence I find for that reason the appeal is dismissed.
(R. at 301, pp. 118:18–119:6.) 3
2.

Pacific Cannot Unilaterally Allege a Due-Process Violation,
Pronounce Itself, as a Result, Free to Disregard a Clear Statutory Ban,
Add Evidence to a Closed Record, and Raise New Claims Based
Thereon.

Regardless of the nature and status of the Black brochure as evidence—proper or
improper—certainly, Pacific’s solution is out of all proportion to the supposed offense. In
response to what it has labeled Grantsville’s “violat[ion of] Pacific’s due process rights”
(R. at 151), Pacific has somehow seceded from LUDMA. Its cannonade against §801(8)’s Fort Sumter (so to speak) reads as follows:
Even though judicial review is based on the record, that record must be
“viewed in the light of accepted due process requirements.” Xanthos v. Board
of Adjustment, 685 P.2d 1032, 1034 (Utah 1984). These due process
requirements exist to ensure, as the Court said in Springville Citizens, “that the
3

Strictly speaking, of course, this point goes to Pacific’s cross-appeal rather than to
Grantsville’s appeal. However, because the foundation of the rulings against which
Grantsville contends are the affidavits Pacific ostensibly submitted in response to the
Julie Black brochure, the district court’s redaction thereof takes on a significance belied
by its apparent innocuousy (as discussed in § I.D, below).
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City proceeded within the limits of fairness and acted in good faith.” 1999 UT
25, ¶24. If due process requirements have not been met, then the Court is
entitled to consider evidence outside the record in order to “get at the facts.”
The Court must then “be allowed to take its own evidence and need not
necessarily be limited to the evidence presented” before the City. Xanthos, 685
P.2d at 1034. [Therefore, b]ecause the City violated Pacific’s due process
rights in basing its decision on documents and evidence at the February 21,
2007, hearing and without given Pacific a chance to respond, Pacific has
presented additional evidence outside the record. That evidence is presented
through the affidavits of Caleb Roope, Douglas Gibson, and Dennis
Vanderheiden … .
(R. at 151). This is Pacific’s entire argument on this point.
Because a complete and unassailable administrative record exists (R. at 44), Pacific
has taken language from Xanthos (out of context) to bolster its argument that the City
Council’s review of the Black brochure—despite its being essentially a duplicative
summary of evidence already in the record—infringed its due-process rights.

And,

although the author wove them well, the quotations above do not say what Pacific wishes
them to.
To begin with, of course, Pacific would be hard pressed to find a case less
supportive of its position. In Xanthos, there was no administrative record to which the
district court could turn, and its receipt of evidence “to get at the facts” was entirely
reasonable. 685 P.2d at 1034. As the Court there explained:
[I]f the hearing had proceeded in accordance with due process requirements,
the reviewing court could look only to the record, but where it had not or
where there was nothing to review, the reviewing court must be allowed to get
at the facts.
****
[T]he district court may [in such circumstances] take additional evidence, but
it must be relevant to the issues that were raised and considered by the Board.
Id. at 1034–35. Pacific makes much of the adverbial “in accordance with due process
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requirements,” stressing that the Black brochure’s submission and receipt was exactly the
sort of due-process infraction the Xanthos Court sought to avert.
Pacific, however, misreads Xanthos. In making its ruling, the Xanthos Court relied
upon the reasoning of the Denver & Rio Grande Court, who noted that an administrative
body would have complied with the “accepted due process requirements” if it had
“conducted a hearing, taken evidence, heard witnesses under oath and otherwise had
proceeded in accordance with such due process requirements,” 287 P.2d at 887 (citing 42
Am. Jur. p. 449 § 116).4 These are plainly general considerations, applicable to entire
proceedings, not to duplicative summaries of evidence already available which wind up
being disregarded anyway. Such a misstep—if misstep it was—does not rise to the level
of a serious breach in the process due to Pacific, or to anyone else for that matter. As the
Utah Supreme Court recently noted:
The hallmarks of due process are notice and an opportunity to be heard, but
not all proceedings demand the same level of process. The level of process
required generally depends on the following factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
[S]econd, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and [Third] the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, [Fourth]
the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.

4

Unfortunately, the reviewing court was presented with very little to review in the
Denver & Rio Grande case, and the Supreme Court felt this deficiency merited the taking
of evidence beyond the record: “[W]here, as here, there is nothing to review but an ipse
dixit, due process would be denied if the reviewing Court could not get at the facts.” 287
P.2d at 887.
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Utah County v. Ivie, 2006 UT 33, ¶22, 137 P.3d 797 (emphasis added; citation omitted).5
Going through these factors one at a time: (1) The private interest affected is fairly
minimal, since Pacific may build out Country Haven according to the approved original
plan whenever it likes; it is not being held hostage. (2) There is very little risk—none in
fact—of Pacific’s being “erroneous[ly] deprive[ed]” of a property interest it has never
had (that is, to disregard the approved 1997 Project Plans); however, Pacific has been
given full and free opportunity to present its arguments, including Planning Commission
and City Council hearings both in 2005 and in 2007 (R. at 44: Exh. 5, Exh. 9, Exh. 10,
and Exh. 11). (3) There would have been little or no practical value in reconvening the
City Council for Pacific to respond to the Black brochure, since Pacific’s response would
have been, of necessity, simply be a reiteration of points it had already made, the
brochure being little more than a summary of information already in the record (see, e.g.,
R. at 44: Exh. 10 & Exh. 22). And, finally, (4) as noted, such a rehearing would have
required still another rehashing of by-now-well-known data, information, and arguments

5

The omitted citation upon which the Ivie Court relied was to Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319 (1976), which gives somewhat more slack even than Ivie to what
constitutes sufficient procedural due process:
We reiterate … that differences in the origin and function of administrative
agencies preclude wholesale transplantation of the rules of procedure, trial and
review which have evolved from the history and experience of courts.…The
essence of due process is the requirement that a person in jeopardy of
serious loss (be given) notice of the case against him and opportunity to
meet it. All that is necessary is that the procedures be tailored, in light of the
decision to be made, to the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be
heard, to insure that they are given a meaningful opportunity to present their
case.
Id. at 335 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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(developer’s doggedness versus neighbor annoyance) leading right back to where we are
now.
Pacific will have to find something much stronger that the Black brochure upon
which to base both its extra evidence and its additional arguments. As it is, though,
Pacific’s response to this three-page pamphlet (three affidavits, one of them quite
lengthy, and a Rule 56(f) motion, and two extraneous causes of action) seems somewhat
disproportionate.
In any case, regardless of Pacific’s vehemence, and the tenor of its rhetoric, the fact
remains that, except in the absence or improper deficiency of the administrative record,
UCA § 10-9a-801(8) outlaws the acceptance or consideration of any evidence beyond the
record created before the land-use or appeal authority. As a result, the Affidavits of Caleb
Roope, Douglas Gibson, and Dennis Vanderheiden should have been excluded from the
district court’s proceedings and cannot serve as the foundation of any of the new claims
Pacific has asserted based upon them. This Court must therefore disregard both Pacific’s
affidavits and its arguments resting on the information in them.
C.

Pacific’s Failure to Raise its Bona-Fide–Purchaser and PUD-Termination/
Unenforceability6 Claims before the Grantsville City Council Barred its
Raising them before the District Court.
1.

State law bars Pacific’s raising its extraneous claims.

In Badger v. Brooklyn Canal, as noted above, the Utah Supreme Court explained
the rationale behind record-only review as analogous to the long-established rule that a
litigant must raise an issue before the district court in order to preserve it for appeal:
6

For the sake of brevity, the PUD-termination/unenforceability claims shall be
denominated the “No-PUD” claims throughout.
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In a trial setting, to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must first
raise the issue in the trial court. That is, a trial court must be offered an
opportunity to rule on an issue…. The purpose of [this] requirement[] is to put
the judge on notice of the asserted error and allow the opportunity for
correction at that time in the course of the proceeding. Issues not raised at trial
are usually deemed waived.
Similarly, a party seeking review of [an] agency action must raise an
issue before that agency to preserve the issue for further review. It is well
settled that persons aggrieved by decisions of administrative agencies may not,
by refusing or neglecting to submit issues of fact to such agencies, by-pass
them, and call upon the courts to determine ... matters properly determinable
originally by such agencies.
Badger, 966 P.2d at 847–48 (emphasis added) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). In non-administrative proceedings, a claim is barred on appellate review unless
it was demonstrably brought to the district court’s attention both (1) timely and (2)
specifically, together with (3) supporting evidence or legal authority. Id. at 848 (quoting
Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm’n, 945 P.2d 125, 130 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)). A rather
less stringent standard applies to issues on district-court review of administrative actions,
however:
[The] strict waiver analysis ... appli[cable] to issues or objections not raised
before a trial court…. does not apply … to [agency] hearings … but instead …
a “level of consciousness” test, requiring a plaintiff to bring an issue to the fact
finder’s attention so that there is at least the possibility that it could be
considered.
Id. at 848 (citing US Xpress, Inc. v. State Tax Comm’n, 886 P.2d 1115, 1119 n.7 (Utah
Ct. App. 1994)).
This clear, straightforward rule plainly mandates that before it could properly raise
its bona-fide–purchaser and No-PUD claims before the district court (R. at 250 & 301,
pp. 119–120), Pacific should have brought them first to the attention of the Grantsville
City Council. One searches the administrative record (R. at 44) in vain, however, for any
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mention of Pacific’s bona-fide–purchaser or No-PUD claims before either the Planning
Commission or City Council. These appear nowhere until the filing of Pacific’s Petition
for Review7 (R. at 4–6), never having been so much as mentioned, let alone addressed, at
the administrative level.
Pacific, however, was well aware of this fact, as it has essentially admitted in its
Memorandum in Support of Rule 56 Motion and supporting Affidavit (see R. at 109 &
113) as well as in its Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgement
(see R. at 151 & 123–26) wherein it asserted its new causes of action on the basis of the
improper and extraneous Roope, Gibson, and Vanderheiden affidavits (R. at 79–85, 97–
102, & 93–96, respectively). Inclusion of these arguments is in direct defiance of clear,
iron-clad statutory and case law forbidding the introduction of anything beyond the
administrative record. Pacific’s addition of these extraneous bona-fide–purchaser and
No-PUD claims to its Petition for Review was thus improper; as a result, these claims
must be dismissed as beyond the jurisdiction of the Courts.
2.

Grantsville ordinance also bars Pacific’s introduction of issues beyond
those raised before the City Council.

UCA § 10-9a-701(4)(c) grants Utah municipalities the power to “require an
adversely affected party to present to an appeal authority every theory of relief that it can

7

Grantsville notes again, in this context, that § 10-9a-801 limits administrative review to
the record below. Given the absolute restriction of §-801(3)(a)(ii)—“shall … determine
ONLY whether [the administrative determination was] arbitrary, capricious, or illegal”
(emphasis added)—a litigant cannot lawfully present ANY cause of action beyond the
straightforward, statutory arbitrary-and-capricious–or-illegal claim. If a litigant were
allowed to present such claims, then the §-801(3)(a)(ii) restriction becomes meaningless,
as does the §-801(8) limitation of review to the record.
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raise in district court.” Pursuant to this legislative grant, local Grantsville ordinance
provides that, “[i]n making an appeal, an adversely affected party shall present to the
appeal authority every theory of relief that it can raise in district court.” Grantsville Code
§ 3.22 (emphasis added).
Pacific’s raising of its bona-fide–purchaser and No-PUD claims thus also falls foul
of both LUDMA and Grantsville ordinance. Pacific simply cannot be heard on its new
causes of action: it is a violation of the clear language of UCA § 10-9a-801, all relevant
case law, and uncomplicated local ordinance. Such broad-spectrum disregard for the law
must not be permitted to jam monkey-wrench precedent into the smooth operation of the
only recently retooled mechanism of Utah land-use law.
D.

Conclusion to Part I.

To sum up: (1) The record-only rule of UCA § 10-9a-801(8)(a) forbids the
introduction of evidence outside the administrative record. (2) Pacific submitted the
Roope, Gibson, and Vanderheiden affidavits on the pretext that City Council
consideration of the Black brochure somehow erased §-801(8)(a) and all of the case law
from which it derives. (3) It was upon these affidavits that Pacific constructed its
extraneous bona-fide–purchaser and No-PUD claims. It follows, then, (4) that the
redaction—or harmlessness—of the Black brochure entirely eliminated any foundation
(however unconvincing) for submitting the three improper affidavits. As a result, (5)
Pacific’s extraneous claims are left without even their original sandy foundation, and the
district court’s granting summary and declaratory judgments thereon becomes, not just
improper, but impossible.
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In sum, the Roope, Gibson, and Vanderheiden affidavits must be stricken, the bonafide–purchaser and No-PUD claims based upon them dismissed, and the district court’s
judgment thereon vacated.

II. EVEN IF PACIFIC’S ADDITIONAL CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE WERE ARGUENDO
PROPERLY BEFORE THE DISTRICT COURT, THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN
GRANTING SUMMARY AND DECLARATORY JUDGEMENT THEREON.
A.

Pacific’s Claim that it is a Bona-Fide Purchaser Must Fail on Both
Procedural and Substantive Grounds.

The first of the two causes of action Pacific improperly raised for the first time in its
petition for review is its claim to be a bona-fide purchaser without notice of—and hence
not bound by—the original PUD’s final plat approval. Utah law as to the nature and
rights of bona-fide purchasers comes from Chapter 57-3 of the Utah Code:
Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as against any
subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of it, if: (1) the
subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith and for a valuable
consideration; and (2) the subsequent purchaser’s document is first duly
recorded.
UCA § 57-3-103.
1.

There is a Development Plan for Future Phases.

Central to Pacific’s arguments is its allegation that the Final Plat (approved back in
1997) contains no “development plan” that it is duty bound to follow: no engineering
drawings, no list of requirements for the several unit types, no floor plans (See, e.g., R. at
134-44). In short, Pacific argues that there is nothing to which it may be held in further
developing future phases of Country Haven. It is of this set of “restrictions” that Pacific
now claims to have had no knowledge upon purchase, seeking to be excused therefrom.
This, however, is entirely untrue: the original, November 1997 engineering
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drawings (R. at 44, Exh. 22) include street, utility, and grading diagrams. The client is
identified upon the drawings (lower right-hand corner) as “Garry Bolinder” (a
representative of Pacific at present) (Id. at Sheets 3, 9, & 10 of 10), “G&S Investments
(sheet 4 of 10), or “Bolinder” (Id. at Sheets 6, 7, & 8 of 10).8 The drawing, submitted by
the developer and approved by the City, also show the same detail for the completion of
the future phases as they do for the completion of Phase 1. The “Grading Plan,” for the
future phases lists the elevations of the roads, buildings, and storm retention areas, and
identifies flow directions and the exact location and elevations of storm drain lines (Id. at
Sheet 3 of 10). The “Utility Plan” for the future phases, includes the size and layout of
the sewer and waterlines, manholes, valves and fire hydrants (Id. at Sheet 4 of 10). The
“Plan and Profile” for all of the roads in the project, includes detailed specifications for
the future phases (id. at Sheets 6 & 7 of 10). The “Storm Drain” details for the entire
project, including the future phases, are also included (id. at Sheet 8 of 10). Finally, the
letter designations of the units in the Future Phases are the same as the designations of the
units in the first phase (id. at Sheet 3 of 10).
The Final Plat (R. at 44, Exh. 23), “recorded at the request of Garry L. and Stacey P.
Bolinder” at 10:36 a.m. on May 5th, 1998, depicts both “Phase 1” and “Future Phases”; an
“Owner’s Dedication” signed by the Bolinders; a legend showing survey monuments,
hydrant locations, power pole locations, and utility setbacks; a scale drawing of the
proposed roads, storm retention areas, a sports court, and driveways (most are wide
enough to accommodate two cars side by side and two car garages). (Id.) The Final Plat
8

Sheets 1, 2, & 5 appear to be missing from the Record.
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also shows scale drawings and the exact location of 23 buildings comprising 63
residential units, identified as types A, C, D, E and F, similar in size and configuration as
the residential units in the first phase. (Id.)
Pacific cannot credibly claim that it was unaware of a development plan that its own
representatives and its predecessor in interest had had prepared. Most of its argument
before the City Council relied directly upon the existence of a final development plan of
which their new plan was only a “minor alteration” of the development plan it now
wishes to deny even exists:
We believe we are complying with what happened in 1998 … . We feel we
have kept the plan close to conditions set by the Commission ten years [ago].
(R. at 44, Exh. 9, p.4);
The placement of the units on the site is based on a previously approved condo
plat and we have matched that as closely as possible… . We reviewed the
original construction documents for the first eight units and used that same
massing, materials and look… . As to the two car garage concern, we tried to
fit that plan in there, but we couldn’t.
(R. at 44, Exh. 9, pp. 10–11); or
[I]n order to really understand what was approved for the Country Haven
Condo’s [sic] you must go to the recorded plat for the requirements… . We
believe that … we are talking about a minor adjustment.
(R. at 44, Exh.6, p. 2). These and other statements demonstrate that Pacific was well
aware of the final development plan it now wishes did not exist; the fact remains,
however, that they were and it does, and further development must abide by its
strictures.
2.

Pacific had Actual, Constructive, and Inquiry Notice of the
Restrictions on the PUD prior to purchase.

4846-2457-1395.GR058.001

32

The comments quoted above would seem to topple any claim by Pacific as to bonafide purchase. Under Utah law,
To be in good faith, a subsequent purchaser must take the property [a] without
notice of a prior, unrecorded interest in the property[, and] … [b] without
notice of any infirmity in his grantor’s title. This … is not confined to …
actual notice of an unrecorded interest or infirmity in the grantor's title[,
but].… includes … constructive notice of such information [as well],
including both [i] record notice[,] which results from a record or which is
imputed by the recording statutes, and [ii] inquiry notice[,] … presumed
because of the fact that a person has knowledge of certain facts which should
impart to him, or lead him to, knowledge of the ultimate fact.
Salt Lake County v. Metro West Ready Mix, Inc., 2004 UT 23, ¶13, 89 P.3d 155
(emphasis added; internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (citing, inter alia,
Paldevco Ltd. P’ship v. City of Auburn Hills, 1998 WL 1988569, *2 (Mich. Ct. App.
Dec. 18, 1998) (unpublished per curiam decision) (“Notice need only be of the possibility
of the rights of another, not positive knowledge of those rights.” (Emphasis added)) A
copy of this decision is included in the Addendum as Tab E).
Applying the above test to the present matter demonstrates that Pacific had ample—
even abundant—notice of the approved engineering drawings (R. at 44: Exh. 22) and
final plat (R. at 44: Exh. 23), and this knowledge precludes anything like bona-fide–
purchaser status for Pacific. Pacific, nonetheless, urges its claim under UCA § 57-3-103,
which states in relevant part, that “[e]ach document not recorded as provided in this title
is void as against any subsequent purchaser of the same real property.”
The documents from which arise the strictures to which Pacific objects, however,
either have been recorded with the Final Plat in 1998, or have been in the possession of
Pacific from the beginning (else it would not have been able to present a “minor
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amendment” to the City). Of course, the recording of the Plat showing future phases and
plans for those phases (R. at 44: Exh. 22 and Exh. 23) provides precisely the constructive
notice to Pacific contemplated by Metro West Ready Mix.

There is absolutely no

question these plans have been on file providing notice since 1998. And regardless, a
document cannot be invalidated as to any party with actual notice of its existence, UCA §
57-3-102(3), such as Pacific obviously is. In any case, the mere existence of the Final
Plat in the County Recorder’s office alone put Pacific on notice that the property was a
part of a Planned Unit Development, and that a detailed plan for the development of the
balance of the property existed.
Most tellingly, however, according to Pacific’s own arguments, it was aware of all
of the documents—the engineering drawings, the Final Plat, and the minutes from the
City Council’s original approval—prior to making its application to develop the “future
phases” of the property. (R. at 167-69.)
This claim should never have gone before the court, since it was not raised before
the City Council; but, even assuming the argument were proper, Pacific cannot lay
credible claim to being a bona-fide purchaser of the Country Haven property; it knew far
too much about the PUD for far too long.
3.

A Determination of Bona-Fide Purchase is a Factual Question that
Precludes Summary Judgment.

Grantsville notes that Utah law recognizes the determination of whether one is a
bona-fide purchaser as a question of fact, Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381, 1394 (Utah
1996) (“the determination of whether the trust deed property was sold to a bona fide
purchaser or to one with actual or constructive notice … involves questions of fact which
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must be determined by the trial court on remand”); Nokes v. Continental Mining &
Milling Co., 308 P.2d 954, 954 (Utah 1957) (in which “[t]he controlling question [was]
one of fact: Was Mr. Nokes a bona fide purchaser for value[?]”). Summary judgment,
however, is intended to resolve issues of law, and is inappropriate in the presence of
material issues of fact. Ellsworth Paulsen Const. Co. v. 51-SPR-L.L.C., 2008 UT 28, ¶14,
183 P.3d 248. As the Supreme Court has explained,
On an appeal of a district court’s entry of summary judgment, we apply the
same standard as applied by the district court. City Consumer Servs. v. Peters,
815 P.2d 234, 239 (Utah 1991); Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332, 1334
(Utah 1977). According to that standard, summary judgment is only
appropriate where “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” URCP 56(c).
“‘When reviewing a court’s decision to grant summary judgment, we examine
the court’s legal conclusions for correctness.’” Young v. Salt Lake City Sch.
Dist., 2002 UT 64, ¶ 10, 52 P.3d 1230 (quoting Tustian v. Schriever, 2001 UT
84, ¶ 13, 34 P.3d 755). “If, after a review of the record, it appears that there is
a material factual issue, we are compelled to reverse the trial court’s grant of
summary judgment.” W. Farm Credit Bank v. Pratt, 860 P.2d 376, 378 (Utah
Ct.App.1993) (citing Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 957
(Utah Ct.App.1989)).
Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Center, Inc., 2003 UT 23, ¶13, 70 P.3d 904.
In the present case, of course, the administrative record is replete with evidence
directly contesting Pacific’s bona-fide–purchaser claim (see § II.A.1, above), creating
numerous issues of material fact if not more. The district court thus could not properly
grant summary judgment, and this Court “[is] compelled to reverse” it. Ellsworth, 2008
UT 28 at ¶14.
B.

Pacific’s Claim that the PUD has been Extinguished Must Fail Because it
is Based upon an Erroneous Reading of Grantsville Code § 12.4(5).

Pacific’s second improper claim (as not brought before the City Council) is the
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assertion of the Grantsville Code’s provision regarding PUD lifespans:
No planned unit development permit shall be valid for a period longer than
one year unless a building permit has been issued, construction has actually
begun within that period and construction has been diligently pursued.
City Code § 12.4(5). Permits, however, were issued for Phase I, unquestionably part of
the PUD, and construction did begin thereon within the one-year limit, and it was
diligently pursued to completion. (R. at 203-04.) Residential units and the necessary
infrastructure were timely constructed in Phase 1. Section 12.4(5) does not require
construction to begin or to be pursued in the future phases of a project until those future
phases are included on an approved final plat and the infrastructure improvements for
that phase have been bonded for.9
It must be remembered that Pacific pursued the completion of the project before the
Planning Commission and City Council with the expressed grounds it was in substantial
conformity with the original development plan. Pacific cannot now claim that the PUD is
void, after it has attempted to use the previously approved “final development plan” as
the basis upon which the future phases of the project would be completed. By using the
previously approved PUD as a starting point, Pacific avoided the requirement of
submitting a new concept plan and being required to have public hearings on a new
proposal that undoubtedly would be opposed by the neighbors.
Moreover, Pacific can hardly denounce the PUD as void after having brought it
before the City in 2005 and in 2007 seeking to complete the project in conformity with
the initial plan (R. at 224). Pacific can’t take one stand one day and then a completely
9

It would hardly seem practical or logical to have future phases, six in this case, if future
phases had to be constructed within the year.
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contradictory one the next, but even if it could, LUD&M § 12.4(5) shouldn’t apply to
terminate the PUD, since it timely began, and the one-year limitation has not been
violated.
C.

Pacific’s Claim that the Country Haven CC&Rs no Longer Apply to the
Land at Issue is Irrelevant.

Pacific argued before the district court that the CC&Rs no longer applied to the
Land because a First Amendment to the original CC&Rs referred to in the Final Plat
referred solely to Phase 1 and not to Phase 2. The PUD was approved by Grantsville
pursuant to its authority in § 12.2 as a conditional use. Once approved, the PUD can only
be amended as required by City ordinances. See § 12.5. Indeed, only the City Council
can approve any zoning changes. See UCA § 10-9a-503. The PUD cannot be amended
simply by the recording of an amended restrictive covenant that has neither been
reviewed nor approved by the appropriate municipal authorities. Therefore, the district
court improperly held that the PUD did not apply to anything other than Phase 1 because
of an amendment to the CC&Rs. (R. 272–73.)
In addition, the amendment to the CC&Rs is irrelevant to the PUD requirements
because CC&Rs are contracts that bind only the participating parties. “Restrictive
covenants that run with the land and encumber subdivision lots form a contract between
subdivision property owners as a whole and individual lot owners.” Swensen v. Erickson,
2000 UT 16, ¶11, 998 P.2d 807. Grantsville was not a party to CC&Rs or the First
Amendment. Any amendment to the CC&Rs can have no binding effect on the PUD
process that is established in Grantsville City ordinances. Therefore, the First
Amendment by itself can have no effect to limit or expand on the property subject to the
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PUD application submitted to and approved by Grantsville. Pacific’s action, if one
exists, on this argument must be made, not to Grantsville, but to all of the property
owners affected by the alleged change to the CC&Rs, which must necessarily include all
of the property owners within Phase 1. Again, the district court improperly held that the
amendment to the CC&Rs caused the PUD to be applicable only to Phase 1, and its
decision on this issue must be overturned.
D.

Pacific’s Claim that the Statute of Frauds Renders the Originally
Approved Plan Inapplicable must Fail.

Pacific also claims that the design restrictions appearing on the approved 1997
project plan are unenforceable against the future phases pursuant to the Statute of Frauds.
Specifically, argues Pacific, those restrictions were not signed by the City or by Pacific’s
predecessor in interest; they are therefore barred from application by UCA § 25-5-1:
No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a term not exceeding
one year, nor any trust or power over or concerning real property or in any
manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or
declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance
in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering
or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing.10
This statute, however, has no bearing on the approved development plans for the Country
Haven PUD: zoning restrictions, including the parameters of a PUD, apply by action of

10

Below, Pacific cited to Forest Meadow Ranch Prop. Owners Ass’n v. Pine Meadow
Ranch Home Ass’n, 2005 UT App 294, ¶¶18 & 22, 118 P.3d 871, for the proposition that
covenants running with the land must be signed by the party creating the restraint. (R. at
123.) The Utah Supreme Court, however, stripped Forest Meadow of its precedential
value in Peters v. Pine Meadow Ranch Home Ass’n, 2007 UT 2, ¶23, 151 P.3d 962:
“[W]e affirm the result reached by the court of appeals in both Forest Meadow and
Peters, limit the court of appeals' decisions to the facts of each case, and deem the
decisions to be without precedential effect.”
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law as delegated by the Utah legislature to Utah’s municipalities. Such laws are not
subject to the statute of frauds. Citizens are not required to read and execute all land-use
laws before they take effect. The statute itself excepts use-restriction “by act or operation
of law”; and, although PUDs are not, in and of themselves, “estates or interests in real
property,” their creation is certainly “by operation of law,” and therefore expressly
excepted from the statute.
Even if the statute of frauds were controlling, Pacific’s predecessor presented the
Preliminary Plans (City Ex. 22) and presented and signed the Final Plat (City Ex. 23), and
these documents contain most of the elements of the Final Development Plan governing
the development of the future phases of the project.

CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, Grantsville requests that the district court’s decision to
grant Pacific summary and declaratory judgment be reversed.
Dated this ____ day of October, 2008,
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DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
URCP, Rule 56(c)

Summary Judgment.

****
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be
in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment,
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although
there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
****

UCA § 10-9a-701
(1)

Each municipality adopting a land use ordinance shall, by ordinance, establish one
or more appeal authorities to hear and decide:
(a)

requests for variances from the terms of the land use ordinances; and

(b) appeals from decisions applying the land use ordinances.
(2)

(4)

As a condition precedent to judicial review, each adversely affected person shall
timely and specifically challenge a land use authority's decision, in accordance with
local ordinance.
****
By ordinance, a municipality may:
(a)

designate a separate appeal authority to hear requests for variances than the
appeal authority it designates to hear appeals;

(b) designate one or more separate appeal authorities to hear distinct types of
appeals of land use authority decisions;
(c)

require an adversely affected party to present to an appeal authority every
theory of relief that it can raise in district court;

(d) not require an adversely affected party to pursue duplicate or successive
appeals before the same or separate appeal authorities as a condition of the
adversely affected party's duty to exhaust administrative remedies; and
(e)

provide that specified types of land use decisions may be appealed directly to
the district court.
****

4846-2457-1395.GR058.001

42

UCA § 10-9a-801
(1)

No person may challenge in district court a municipality's land use decision made
under this chapter, or under a regulation made under authority of this chapter, until
that person has exhausted the person's administrative remedies as provided in Part 7,
Appeal Authority and Variances, if applicable.

(2) (a)

Any person adversely affected by a final decision made in the exercise of or in
violation of the provisions of this chapter may file a petition for review of the
decision with the district court within 30 days after the local land use decision
is final.
****

(3)

(a)

The courts shall:
(i)

presume that a decision, ordinance, or regulation made under the
authority of this chapter is valid; and

(ii) determine only whether or not the decision, ordinance, or regulation is
arbitrary, capricious, or illegal.
(b) A decision, ordinance, or regulation involving the exercise of legislative
discretion is valid if it is reasonably debatable that the decision, ordinance, or
regulation promotes the purposes of this chapter and is not otherwise illegal.
(c)

A final decision of a land use authority or an appeal authority is valid if the
decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record and is not arbitrary,
capricious, or illegal.

(d) A determination of illegality requires a determination that the decision,
ordinance, or regulation violates a law, statute, or ordinance in effect at the
time the decision was made or the ordinance or regulation adopted.
(6)

****
The petition is barred unless it is filed within 30 days after the appeal authority's
decision is final.

(7) (a)

The land use authority or appeal authority, as the case may be, shall transmit to
the reviewing court the record of its proceedings, including its minutes,
findings, orders, and, if available, a true and correct transcript of its
proceedings.

(b) If the proceeding was tape recorded, a transcript of that tape recording is a true
and correct transcript for purposes of this Subsection (7).
(8) (a) (i)

If there is a record, the district court's review is limited to the record
provided by the land use authority or appeal authority, as the case may
be.

(ii) The court may not accept or consider any evidence outside the record of
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the land use authority or appeal authority, as the case may be, unless that
evidence was offered to the land use authority or appeal authority,
respectively, and the court determines that it was improperly excluded.
(b) If there is no record, the court may call witnesses and take evidence.
****

UCA § 57-3-103
Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as against any subsequent
purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of it, if:
(1)

the subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith and for a valuable
consideration; and

(2)

the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded.

UCA § 70A-8-302
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Subsections (2) and (3), a purchaser of a certificated
or uncertificated security acquires all rights in the security that the transferor had or
had power to transfer.
(2) A purchaser of a limited interest acquires rights only to the extent of the interest
purchased.
(3) A purchaser of a certificated security who as a previous holder had notice of an
adverse claim does not improve its position by taking from a protected purchaser.

UCA § 78B-6-401
(1)

Each district court has the power to issue declaratory judgments determining rights,
status, and other legal relations within its respective jurisdiction. An action or
proceeding may not be open to objection on the ground that a declaratory judgment
or decree is prayed for.

(2)

The declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect and shall
have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree.
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Grantsville Land Use Management and Development Code
§ 3.22

APPEALS.

(1)

The applicant or any other person or entity adversely affected by a decision
administering or interpreting a land use ordinance may appeal that decision applying
the land use ordinance by alleging that there is error in any order, requirement,
decision, or determination made by an official in the administration, interpretation,
or enforcement of the land use ordinance within 30 days of the decision.

(2)

Any officer, department, board, or bureau of Grantsville City affected by the grant,
or refusal of a building permit or by any other decisions of the zoning administrator
in the enforcement and administration of the land use ordinance may appeal any
decision to the board of adjustment. The appellant has the burden of proving that the
land use authority erred.

(3)

Only decisions applying the ordinance may be appealed to the board of adjustment.

(4)

A person may not appeal, and the Board of Adjustment may not consider, any land
use ordinance amendments.

(5)

Appeals may not be used to waive or modify the terms or requirements of the land
use ordinance.

(6)

In making an appeal, an adversely affected party shall present to the appeal authority
every theory of relief that it can raise in district court.

§ 3.24

DUE PROCESS

(1)

Each appeal authority shall conduct each appeal and variance request as provided in
local ordinance.

(2)

Each appeal authority shall respect the due process rights of each of the participants.

§ 7.8
(1)

Determination.

(Amended 6/00)

The Planning Commission, or upon authorization, the Zoning Administrator, may
permit a use to be located within a zoning district in which a conditional use permit
is required by the use regulations of that zoning district or elsewhere in these
ordinances. The Zoning Administrator is also authorized to issue conditional use
permits for family food production and the raising of horses in the R-1-21 and RM-7
zoning districts, when appropriate, but may also defer any such application to the
Planning Commission for its determination, in the sole discretion of the Zoning
Administrator. In authorizing any conditional use the Planning Commission or
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Zoning Administrator shall impose such requirements and conditions as are
necessary for the protection of adjacent properties and the public welfare. The
Planning Commission or Zoning Administrator shall only approve with conditions,
or deny a conditional use based upon written findings of fact with regard to each of
the standards set forth below and, where applicable, any special standards for
conditional uses set forth in a specific zoning district. The Planning Commission or
Zoning Administrator shall not authorize a conditional use permit unless the
evidence presented is such as to establish:
(a)

The proposed use is one of the conditional uses specifically listed in the zoning
district in which it is to be located;

(b) That such use will not, under the circumstances of the particular case, be
detrimental to the health, safety, comfort, order or general welfare of persons
residing or working in the vicinity;
(c)

That the use will comply with the intent, spirit, and regulations of these
ordinances and is compatible with and implements the planning goals and
objectives of the City, including applicable City master plans;

(d) Make the use harmonious with the neighboring uses in the zoning district in
which it is to be located;
(e)

That nuisances which would not be in harmony with the neighboring uses, will
be abated by the conditions imposed;

(f)

That protection of property values, the environment, and the tax base for
Grantsville City will be assured;

(g)

That the conditions shall be in compliance with the current comprehensive
General Plan of Grantsville City;

(h) That some form of a guarantee is made assuring compliance to all conditions
that are imposed;
(i)

That the conditions imposed are not capricious, arbitrary or contrary to any
precedence set by the Planning Commission on prior permits, which are similar
in use and district, unless prior approvals were not in accordance with the
provisions and standards of this ordinance;

(j)

The internal circulation system of the proposed development is properly
designed;

(k) Existing and proposed utility services are adequate for the proposed
development;
(l)

Appropriate buffering is provided to protect adjacent land uses from light,
noise and visual impacts;

(m) Architecture and building materials are consistent with the development and
compatible with the adjacent neighborhood;
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(n) Landscaping is appropriate for the scale of the development;
(o)

The proposed use preserves historical, architectural and environmental features
of the property; and

(p) Operating and delivery hours are compatible with adjacent land uses.

§ 12.1
(1)

Purpose. (Amended 11/97)

A planned development is a distinct category of conditional use. As such, it is
intended to encourage the efficient use of land and resources, promote greater
efficiency in public and utility services, preservation of open space, efficient use of
alternative transportation and encouraging innovation in the planning and building
of all types of development. Through the flexibility of the planned unit development
technique, the City and developer will seek to achieve one or more of the following
specific objectives:
(a)

Creation of a more desirable environment than would be possible through strict
application of other City land use regulations:

(b) Promotion of a creative approach to the use of land and related physical
facilities resulting in better design and development, including aesthetic
amenities;
I

Combination and coordination of architectural styles, building forms and
building relationships;

(d) The creation, landscaping and preservation of open space and recreational
facilities;
(e)

Preservation and enhancement of desirable site characteristics such as natural
topography, vegetation and geologic features, and the prevention of soil
erosion;

(f)

Use of design, landscape or architectural features to create a pleasing
environment;

(g)

Preservation of buildings which are architecturally or historically significant
contribute to the character of the City;

(h) Establishment of interconnecting paths and trails for alternative transportation
routes which lead to common and popular destinations and interface with
automobile traffic at few and specific points;
(i)

Provision of a variety of housing, in accordance with the City’s general plans;

(j)

Promote infill development into the core of the City;

(k) Inclusion of special development features; and
(l)

Elimination of blighted structures or incompatible uses through redevelopment
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or rehabilitation.

§ 12.2
(1)

Authority to Modify Regulations.

(Amended 11/97)

The Planning Commission shall have the authority in approving any planned
development to change, alter, modify or waive any provisions of this Code as they
apply to the proposed planned development. No such change, alteration,
modification or waiver shall be approved unless the Planning Commission shall find
that the proposed planned unit development:
(a)

Will achieve one or more the purposes for which a planned development may
be approved pursuant to Section 12.1; and all of the applicable standards of
Section 7.8 have been met to the satisfaction of the Planning Commission.

(b) Will not violate the general purposes, goals and objectives of this Code and of
any plans adopted by the Planning Commission or the City Council.
(2)

No change, alteration, modification or waiver authorized by this Section shall
authorize a change in the uses permitted in any district, a modification with respect
to any standard established by this Chapter or a modification with respect to any
standard in a zoning district made specifically applicable to planned developments,
unless such regulations expressly authorize such a change, alteration, modification
or waiver.

§ 12.3
(1)

Minimum Area.

(Amended 4/97, 4/00)

A planned development proposed for any parcel or tract of land under single
ownership or control shall have a contiguous minimum net site area for each zoning
district as set forth below:
Development Size

Minimum Planned Zoning District
Agriculture District, A

80 Acres

Rural Residential District, RR-5

20 Acres

Rural Residential District, RR-1

10 Acres

Residential District R-1-21

10 Acres

Residential District, R-1-12

5 Acres

Multiple Residential District, RM-7 (Amended 4/97)

7000 Square Feet

Multiple Residential District, RM-15

5 Acres

Neighborhood Commercial District, C-N

20,000 Square Feet

Shopping Commercial District, C-S

60,000 Square Feet
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(2)

General Commercial District, C-G

2 Acres

Light Manufacturing and Distribution District, M-D

5 Acres

General Manufacturing District, M-G

5 Acres

Central Business District, D-1

20,000 Square Feet

Downtown Support District, D-2

40,000 Square Feet

Sensitive Area District, S-A

10 Acres

Not withstanding any provision herein to the contrary, any lot or parcel legally
created or existing as of the effective date of this Code (July 15, 1996), that is
currently located in a commercial or industrial zoning district, may in the discretion
of the Planning Commission and City Council, be developed as a Planned Unit
Development, even if said lot or parcel does not contain the above stated minimum
net site area, provided said development is determined to comply with the other
requirements of this Chapter. (Amended 4/00)

§ 12.4

Application Procedure. (Amended 98, 11/99)

(1)

Except as required by this section, the application and approval procedures for
planned unit developments are the same as is specified in the Subdivision
Regulations contained in Section 2 of Chapter 21 of this Code. Planned unit
developments shall also comply with the other provisions of Chapter 21, where
applicable, including design standards for subdivision. Applications for a planned
unit development concept shall be filed with the City at least 21 days prior to the
Planning Commission meeting where it will first be considered.

(2)

In addition to the application requirements for subdivisions, an applicant for a
planned unit development shall submit the following information with the concept
plan application:
(a)

At the concept phase, the applicant shall submit a written statement addressing
each of the standards set forth in Section 7.8 herein entitled, Determination,
when applicable and how the proposed development will promote the
objectives set forth in Section 12.1 of this Chapter. The statement shall explain
specifically how the proposed planned unit development relates to each such
standard and promotes a listed objective; (Amended 11/99)

(b) At the preliminary phase, the applicant shall submit a written statement
indicating specifically what change, alteration, modification or waiver of any
zoning or development regulation is being sought by the developer, if any.
(Amended 11/99)
(3)

The Chairman of the Planning Commission in consultation with the Zoning
Administrator or the Planning Commission itself may set a public hearing regarding
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any proposed planned unit development, prior to considering an application or at any
time prior to final approval of the development by the Planning Commission. If a
public hearing is set on a proposed planned unit development, written notice to
adjoining property owners shall be required in addition to the regular notice placed
in the local newspaper. The chairman of the Planning Commission or the Planning
Commission itself may specify that written notice be given to property owners
beyond adjoining property owners. The applicant shall be responsible for all of the
costs incurred by the City to provide written and published notice of any such public
hearing.
(4)

The Final Plat approval shall include approval of the final development plan and all
special conditions applicable to the planned unit development. The Final Plat
together with the final development plan and special conditions for the planned unit
development, rather than any other provision of this Ordinance, shall constitute the
use, parking. loading, sign, bulk, space and yard regulations applicable to the subject
property, and no use or development, other than a home occupation or temporary
uses, not allowed by the Final Plat and development plan and conditions shall be
permitted within the area of the planned unit development. The Final Plat shall
include a notation of any changes, alterations, modifications or waivers of the
regular standards of the zoning district and shall list any special conditions.

(5)

(Amended 98) Any party aggrieved by the final decision of the Planning
Commission, with respect to a Concept Phase, Preliminary Phase or Final Plat and
Development Plan regarding a planned unit development, may appeal such decision
to the City Council, whose decision shall then be final. All appeals to the City
Council must be in writing and filed with the Zoning Administrator within thirty
(30) days of the date of the decision appealed from and prior to any further
consideration by the Planning Commission of a subsequent step in the planned unit
development approval process. Only the final decision of the City Council with
respect to the Final Plat and Development Plan may be appealed to the District
Court, provided such appeal is filed within thirty (30) days of the decision of the
City Council. Said appeal shall be filed with the City Recorder and with the Clerk of
the District Court. No planned unit development permit shall be valid for a period
longer than one year unless a building permit has been issued, construction has
actually begun within that period and construction has been diligently pursued.
Upon written request of the applicant, the one year period may be extended by the
Planning Commission for such time as it shall determine for good cause shown,
without further hearing.

§ 12.5
(1)

Adjustments to Development Plan.

No alteration or amendment shall be made in the construction, development or use
without a new application under the provisions of this Code. However, minor
alterations may be made subject to written approval of the Planning Commission
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and the date for completion may be extended by the Planning Commission. During
the build-out of the planned unit development, the Planning Commission may
authorize minor adjustments to the approved Final Development Plan pursuant to the
provisions for modifications to an approved site plan, when such adjustments appear
necessary in light of technical or engineering considerations. Such minor
adjustments shall be limited to the following elements:
(a) Adjusting the distance as shown on the approved final Development Plan
between any one structure or group of structures, and any other structure or group of
structures, or any vehicular circulation element or any boundary of the site;
(b) Adjusting the location of any open space. The size or amount of open space
that was approved shall not be compromised.
(c)

Adjusting any final grade, and

(d) Altering the types of landscaping elements and their arrangement within the
required landscaping buffer area.
(2)

Such minor adjustments shall be consistent with the intent and purpose of the Code
and the Final Development Plan as approved pursuant to this Section, and shall be
the minimum necessary to overcome the particular difficulty and shall not be
approved if such adjustments would result in a violation of any standard or
requirement of this Code.

(3)

Any adjustment to the approved Final Development Plan not authorized by this
Section, shall be considered to be a major adjustment. The Planning Commission
following notice to at least all adjoining property owners, may approve an
application for a major adjustment of the Final Development Plan, not requiring a
modification of written conditions of approval or recorded easements, upon finding
that any changes in the plan as approved will be in substantial conformity to the final
Development Plan. If the Planning Commission determines that a major adjustment
is not in substantial conformity with the Final Development Plan as approved, then
the Planning Commission shall review the request in accordance with the procedures
set forth in Section 12.4.
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